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NOTES
A RETURN TO FILIUS NULLIUS
INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of this note concerns the rights of illegiti-
mates in relation to paternal intestate inheritance. A growing num-
ber of commentators advocate complete equality in intestate suc-
cession between the illegitimate and his biologically legitimate sib-
ling.' These proponants argue that the judicial recognition of illeg-
itimates by the Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana (1968)2 should
extend to paternal inheritance even though the decision dealt with
the right of such children to recover for the death of their mother,
equally with legitimate children, under a Louisiana wrongful death
statute. The Court declared:
Illegitimate children are not 'non-persons.' They are humans,
live and have their being. They are clearly 'persons' within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8
The Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent (1971)4 did not, how-
ever, extend the principles of equality in Levy to intestate inheri-
tance rights, refusing to discuss the subject in an equal protection
context:
The social difference between a wife and a concubine is anal-
ogous to the difference between a legitimate and an illigi-
mate child. One set of relationships is socially sanctioned,
legally recognized, and gives rise to various rights and du-
1. Note, Uniform Probate Code-Illegitimacy, 69 MiCH. L. Rtv. 112, 119 (1970); Note,
Inheritance By, From or Through Illegitimates, 84 U. PA. L. Rsv. 531, 540-541 (1936);
New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial Laws, Illegitimacy, 26
BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 90 (1958) ; Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy
v. Louisiana-First Decision on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 338,
362 (1969) ; Report of the Committee on the Law of Succession in Relation to Illegitimate
Person, 30 MOD. L. Rrv. 532, 555 (1967); Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure,
45 AM. J. Soc. 217, 228-229 (1939).
2. Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
3. Id. at 70.
4. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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ties. The other set of relationships is illicit and beyond rec-
ognition of the law.5 (Emphasis added).
The purpose of this note is to examine the Levy-Labine dichot-
omy in view of an Equal Protection argument. This analysis will in-
clude a discussion of the cases which have accepted or rejected the
contention that Levy extends to other factual situations, including in-
heritance, beyond wrongful death recovery. It is also pertinent to
discuss the purposes advanced by the states in support of discrim-
inatory statutes. Proceding this, an historical foundation is in order.
HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF ILLEGITIMATES
Discrimination. . . is rooted so deeply in our culture that
legislative enactments are generally silent as to purpose.6
Under both French civil law and English common law the il-
legitimate suffered greatly under two basic premises. First, it was
believed that the social, moral stigma of illicit sex attached to the
child:
The rise of Christian morality with its horror of sexual
acts falling outside the monogamous marriage. . . The fact
that it is the child who suffers because of the varying
strength of disapproval put upon his parents' acts is of course
nothing new in the history of moral ideas. Whatever the ba-
sis of the concept of vicarious expiation,-the Greek one of
divine retribution, the Hebrew one of an entail of punish-
ment from generation to generation, or the primitive con-
cept of sin as a contagious matter which may be transmit-
ted from parent to child-it certainly became a well es-
tablished one in Christian morality.7
Secondly, the concept of the family as a state institution was foreign
to illegitimates in that such children were seen as a deterrent to
family unity." Domat, the French jurist, from whom the Louisiana
5. Id. at 538.
6. Krause, Equal Protection For The illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 489 (1967).
7. Robbins & Deak, The Familial Property Righte of Illegitimate Children: A Com-
parative Study, 30 COLUM. L. Rv. 308, 312 (1930). But see generally, Davis, Illegitimacy
and the Social Structure, 4.5 Am. J. Soc. 223 (1939). "As far back as the Middle Ages
there were men (theologians among them) who argued that all offspring, being God-
given, are by nature neither legitimate nor iligitimate, and that it Is irrational to punish
innocent children for the sins of their parents."
8. "An integral trait of the civil law system is a clear and fundamental recognition
of the family as a basic unit of society. The importance of this principle is particularly
seen in the laws of successions, donations and community property." So speaks Chief
Justice Fournut of the Louisiana Supreme Court in DAGGET, MATERIALS ON SUCCESSIONS
(Foreward) (1967) as quoted in Comment, The Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16
LOYOLA L. Rv. 87, 90 n.23 (1970).
NoTEs
Code adopted its distinction between illegitimate and legitimate
children,s once explained the 18th century civil law position as fol-
lows:
Marriage being the only lawful way appointed for the prop-
agation of mankind it is but just to distinguish the condition
of bastards from that of children lawfully begotten.0
This language parallels the distinction made in Labine.
Under these concepts the child became a child of no-one, filius
nullius, and without heirs or family, had no rights of inheritance or
support. The concept of filius nullius was pursued in common law,
as in civil law, under the auspices of family unity and marriage."!
Blackstone, as late as 1840, described the function of family and
marriage in these terms:
[T] rule of descent to English land is that the heir must
be born after actual marriage of its mother and father...
9. The concept that illegitimate children constituted an attack on the family unit
was drafted into the LOUISIANA CODE (1808) and (1825) and was expressed as follows
in the LOUISIANA CODE (1870):
Illegitimate children, generally speaking, belong to no family and have
no relations, accordingly they are not submitted to paternal authority, even
when they have been legally acknowledged. LA. Crvn. CODE art. 238 (1870).
As to inheritance rights the Louisiana provision promotes the exclusionary spirit
of earlier codes.
Bastards, adulterous or Incestuous children shall not enjoy the right of
Inheriting the estates of their natural fathers or mothers, In any of the cases
above mentioned, the law allowing them nothing more than a mere alimony.
LA. CrvIL CODE art. 920 (1952).
The following observations as to the position of Louisiana law upon family life
have been made in Tucker, Sources of Louisiana's Law of Persons, Blackstone, Domat,
and the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REv. 264 (1970):
The law of persons represents something of an Intrusion by the public
law Into the domain of the private. It Is nexus of public order and private
relationships: the most personal aspect of public law, the least Individual
of private law. As reflective of both realms, it Is usually the most char-
acteristic feature of any legal system, and as the least rational area of
civil regulation-held together by the silent force of custom and presuppo-
sition-It is also the least receptive to Innovation.
H. Maine has noted "[T]he movement of the progressive societies has been uni-
form In one respect .... The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit
of which civil laws take account. . . T]he change has not been subject to reaction
or recoil, and apparent retardation will be found to have been occasioned through the
absorption of archaic ideas and customs from some entirely foreign source." H. MIArNE,
ANCIENT LAw 168-169 (14th ed. 1891) as quoted by Tucker, 264.
10. Domat cited Deuternonomy in a footnote to Illegitimacy as authority for the quote.
1 DOMAT, PUS. B. 2 as quoted in Tucker, Sources of Louisiana's Law of Person, Black-
stone, Domat, and the French Codes, 44 TUL. L. REv. 264, 270 (1970).
11. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 446-460 (Lewis ed. 1897); Note, Equal Protection
and How to Enjoy It, 4 GA. L. J. 383-385 (1970) ; Note, Legitimacy: The Liberal Trend
in California, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 232 (1967).
"The common law was historically more austere than the continental code with
regard to inheritance by illegitimates. While at common law an illegitimate was char-
acterized nullius filius 'the son of no one,' and could not Inherit, the civil law had a limit-
ed capacity to Inherit from his mother or father provided that he had been duly acknow-
ledged as a natural child." Recent Decisions, Inheritance by Illegitimates, 21 CASE W.
292, 295 (1970).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
this is a rule of positive inflexible nature, applying to the
inherent in the land itself...12
And the reason of our English Law is surely much superior
to that of the (French) . . , (t)he main end and design of
marriage therefore, being to ascertain and fix upon some
certain person, to whom the care, the protection, and main-
tenance, and the education of the children should belong. 13
It is pertinent to note that illegitimates gained complete equality
as to inheritance rights in France under the Declaration of 1793, when
the French Revolutionaries declared that "all men are equal by na-
ture, and before the law,"' 4 a principle incorporated into the 14th
Amendment.' 5 This lack of discrimination between the various cate-
gories of children was believed to undermine the institution of mar-
riage, and the old concept of filius nullius reappeared in 1803,1 and
was adopted into the Louisiana Code of 1808.17
Likewise, such children were recognized in England, when the
Poor Laws of Elizabeth I in 157618 gave the illegitimate a right of
support from offending parents. Economic conditions, not libertarian
ideals, forced this recognition to relieve the pressures upon the re-
ligious foundations which cared for these children. 19 However, inheri-
tance rights have never been given to illegitimates on this basis in
England or in the United States.
The harsh Common Law Doctrine of filius nullius was adopted
into every United States jurisdiction except Connecticut 20 to the ex-
tent that no rights of inheritance were allowed from either parent.
It became a rule of construction that prima facie the word "children"
meant lawful children only and that the statutes governing intestacy
12. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 454-455 (Lewis ed. 1897).
13. Id.
14. French Declaration of 1793.
15. "No state shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16. Comment, The Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 LOYOLA L. REv. 87, 89, 90
(1968).
17. LA. CIVIL CODE § 1.1.1-2 (1808).
18. 18 Eliz. ch. 3 (1576).
Concerning bastards begotten and born of lawful matrimony, (an offense
against God's law and man's law) the same bastard being now left to be
kept at the charges of the parish where they be born to the great burden
of the same parish, and in defrauding of the belief of the impotent and aged
true poor of the same parish, and to the evil example and encouragement
of the lewd life: it is ordained and enacted by the authority aforesaid that
two justices of the peace . . . shall and may by their discretion take order,
as well as for the punishment of the mother and reputed father of such bas-
tard child as also for the better relief of every such parish in part or in
all; and shall and may likewise by such discretion take order for the keep-
ing of every such bastard child, by charging such mother or reputed father
with the payment of money weekly or other sustenation for the relief of
such child, in such wise as they think meet and convenient ...
19. Stone, Illegitimacy and Claims to Money and Otha- Property: A Comparative Sur-
vey, 15 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 505, 507 (1966).
20. Heath & White, 5 Conn. 228 (1824), but see Todd v. Weber, 95 N.Y. 181, 47 Am.
Rep. 20 (1884).
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referred only to lawful children and did not abrogate Common Law.21
However, as to the mother, case law eventually established rights
against her estate to the illegitimate. 22 Following New York's lead
in 1844,22 the states eventually allowed some form of inheritance by
statute from the mother,24 although Louisiana continues to limit this
right, today. 25
The legislative treatment of intestate succession to children born
out of wedlock depicts a hodge-podge of positions concerning paternal
intestate inheritance by illegitimates.2 1 In thirteen jurisdictions the
statutes are silent as to illegitimate paternal inheritance rights, prob-
ably due to the failure of the law to recognize the relationship be-
tween an illegitimate and his father.27 In some cases, where statutes
are silent, the courts of these jurisdictions have granted some in-
heritance rights even though the parents did not marry, thereby
abrogating judicially, the common law.28 In most cases, however,
the courts have not allowed inheritance rights where the statutes did
not expressly alter the common law.29  The latter position is con-
sistent with the maxim expressed in Reynolds v. Hitchcock that,
"legislation admitting illegitimate children to the right of succes-
sion is undoubtedly in derogation of common law and should be
strictly construed."' 0 Pursuant to legislative intent, in ten jurisdic-
tions, it appears that such children have no intestate rights where
the parents, never marry.
In other states, though a child may be legitimated by the father's
acknowledgement or a paternity suit, the statute will nevertheless
deny inheritance rights if this is the sole means of legitimation. This
view would imply that marriage must accompany such acknowledg-
21. Blacklaws v. Milne, 82 II1. 506 (1876). See generally Note, Inheritance By, From
and Through Illegitimates, 84, U. PA. L. REv. 531 (1936) ; New York State Joint Legisla-
tive Committee on Matrimonial Laws, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45, 47 (1958).
22. Estate of Magee, 63 Cal. 414 (1883), Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234 (1885).
23. N.Y. LAws ch. 547 (1855).
24. New York Committee, supra note 21, at 76-79. Such statutes usually follow this
language. "When the mother of a bastard dies, his real estate shall descend and her per-
sonal estate be distributed in equal share to her legitimate and illegitimate children and
their Issue." N.H. STAT. ANN. § 561.5 (1960).
25. Recent Decisions, Inheritance by Illegitimates, 21 CAsE W. 292, 296 (1970,); LA.
CxVu, CODE ANN. arts. 1484-1485 (1952).
26. Table I, Appendix.
27. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-316 (1961) states that "the illegitimate children of a
female and the issue of illegitimate children of a female are capable to take real and
personal property by inheritance from their mother."
28. Michigan case law has allowed the illegitimate Inheritance rights if the father
acknowledges the child by filing, in the appropriate office, an acknowledgment signed by
two witnesses. This really does not give such children much of a right of Inheritance.
Ghosson v. Stewart's Estate, 319 Mich. 204, 29 N.W.2d 282 (1947), In re Harper's Estate,
272 Mich. 476, 262 N.W. 289 (1935).
29. E.g., Garland v. Harrison, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 368 (1837) ; Rodrigues v. Rodrigues,
286 Mass. 77, 190, N.E. 20 (1934) ; Walker v. Walker, 274 F.2d 425 (S.C. 1960) ; Scalzi
v. Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 838 (R.I. 1957); Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 106 N.J. Super.
61, 254 A.2d 141 (1969).
30. Reynolds v. Hitchcock, 52 N.H. 340, 56 A. 745, 746 (1903) citing Cope v. Cope, 137
U.S. 682 (1891).
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ment.8 1 It may be that these statutes are hold-overs of Blackstone's
concept of the function of marriage as a creation of legal rights.
Many jurisdictions have granted an even greater liberation from the
common law by allowing children born out of wedlock to inherit
from the father who has acknowledged such children to be his own
offspring.3 2 However, this greater liberality is conditioned upon the
statutory preference concerning persons who may take in intestacy
before the acknowledged illegitimate. For example, such children in
Louisiana take only to the exclusion of the escheat of the state. 8
Furthermore, states have placed a myriad of conditions upon these
acknowledgments. In Montana, the father must in writing acknowl-
edge a child to be his own and he must, in addition, sign the acknowl-
edgment in the presence of a witness to establish heirship8 4 In
Nevada, the witness must also sign the declaration. s5 In other states,
statutes have left it to the interpretation of the courts to ascertain
what type of acknowledgment is sufficient.3s
At least ten states allow the child some means to prove pater-
nity for inheritance purposes through the courts.37 On one hand are
those states that stipulate that the father must bring such an action,"8
although this is actually a less than likely event, assuming most
fathers would not actively initiate court proceedings to proclaim his
"guilt" to the world. On the other hand, many statutes take this dis-
cretion out of the father's hands. In Vermont, only the mother can
bring suit,39 whereas in some other states interested public welfare
authorities may bring the action. 40
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1953) "A child conceived out of wedlock shall be
legitimate . . . upon acknowledgment of the paternity made in writing by the parents, if
both are living or by the father if the mother is not living and filed in the Protho-
notary's office of any county of the state."
§ 1304 "Any person legitimated solely by an acknowledgment of paternity in ac-
cordance with § 1301 of this title shall not inherit from the father under the inheritance
laws of this state." (emphasis added)
32. Table I, Appendix.
33. LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. arts. 1482-1486 (1952).
34. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 91-404 (1947).
35. Nrv. REV. STAT. § 134.170 (1967).
36. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-10 (1953). "Every illegitimate child is an heir of the
person who acknowledges himself to be the father of such child, . . . and inherits his
estate . . . In the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock." However,
Maine insists that such declarations be made to a "justice of the peace or notary pub-
lic." ME. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 1003 (1964).
37. E.g., IOWA STAT. ANN. § 633-222 (1964). "Unless he has been adopted, an illegiti-
mate child shall inherit from his natural father when the paternity is proven during the
father's lifetime...." See also IND. CODE ANN. § 6-207 (1954).
38. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904 (1959) "Bastards have no inheritable blood, except
that given to them by express law." § 74-103 (1959) "A father of an illegitimate child
may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his
residence .. " See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (1960).
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553, tit 15, § 331 (Supp. 1970).
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.24 (1961). See generally Krause, Bringing the Bastard Into
the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Illegitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REV. 829, 849
(1966).
The Tennessee statute exemplifies most statutes of this nature in that it causes
suit to be brought in behalf of the child only if state coffers are threatened. The petition
is to be brought by "IT]he mother, or her personal representative, or, if the child is
likely to become a public charge by the state department of public welfare or by any
NOTES
Only three states have expressed the "equality in the law" ideal
of the French Revolution to make illegitimates expressly equal to
legitimates - North Dakota,' 1 Oregon42 and Arizona.48 North Dakota
advances the concept as follows:
Every child is hereby declared to be the legitimate child of
his natural parents, and entitled to support and education,
to the same extent as if he had been born in lawful wedlock.
He shall inherit from his natural parents, and from their
kindred heir, lineal and collateral.4 '
EQUAL PROTECTION
To fully explore the equal protection argument it is necessary to
place the discussion in the context of the contradictory positions re-
ferred to in the introduction. This will entail an examination of Levy,
which extended the equal protection clause in a broad sense to il-
legitimates, as well as Labine, which failed to discuss equal pro-
tection on the narrow issue of paternal intestate inheritance. The
Levy language was unclear in many respects and was a source of
great confusion to state courts subsequently analyzing the decision. 5
Further, it is difficult to determine whether Levy is to be restricted
merely to the narrow facts of that case. Even more perplexing is
an attempt to discover what equal protection test Levy utilized in
striking down Louisiana's Wrongful Death statute as discriminatory.
This lack of clarity, as well as the subsequent confusion in applying
that case, left the Court in Labine a basis to avoid the Levy dec-
laration that illegitimates are entitled to equal protection. To facil-
itate the following analysis of equal protection, Levy and Labine
will serve as the foundation. An overview of the varying state court
opinions will follow to present a broad picture of the equal protec-
tion argument problems and alternatives left open by the Levy de-
cision.
1. The Levy-Labine Dichotomy
Judicially, courts have become more cognizant of the child and
have liberally construed very strict statutes."6 Federal legislation
other person.... ." (emphasis added). TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (Supp. 1970). See
Young v. Willis, 58 Tenn. App. 678, 436 S.W.2d 445 (1968).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1969).
42. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.231 (1969).
43. ARiz. RV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956).
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1969).
45. Krause, The Bastard Finds His Father, 3 FAXs. L. Q., 100, 104 (1969).
46. Judicially the illegitimate has likewise gained some degree of recognition as some
courts have followed this statement of Morrow v. Morrow, 299 Ill. 135, 124 N.E. 386,
387 (1919) :
While . . . the statute conferring rights upon illegitimates is In derogation
of the common law, still the tendency of the legislature in this state . . .
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
likewise has become increasingly aware of the illegitimate in pro-
viding for such children in social legislation. 47 Following this gen-
eral trend of lifting the rigors of the common law from the illegit-
imate, the United States Supreme Court in Levy v. Louisiana recog-
nized that illegitimates are persons within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.48
In Levy, a suit was brought by the administratrix of the mother
of five illegitimates claiming damages as a result of the death of
their mother under a Louisiana wrongful death statute. A Louisiana
District Court dismissed the suit, and a Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that "child" pursuant to the statute means "legitimate
child," thereby denying recovery in the name of promotion of the
"morals and general welfare" through discouraging the bringing
of children into the world out of wedlock.4 9 The Supreme Court
of Louisiana concurred with the lower courts reasoning in denying
certiorari. 50
The United States Supreme Court held the Louisiana statute to
be unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, de-
claring, "[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." 51 Though, as
a result of Levy, it appeared that the Equal Protection Clause would
become the basis upon which to rule other discriminations against
illegitimates unconstitutional, the lack of clarity and completeness
in the Levy opinion created a deficiency which prompted the United
States Supreme Court to reconsider the question of paternal inheri-
tance rights in Labine v. Vincent.52
On March 15, 1962, Rita Vincent was born to Lou Bertha Labine
and Ezra Vincent, who jointly executed a form, acknowledging that
Ezra Vincent was the "natural father" of Rita Vincent. Ezra died
intestate on September 16, 1968, leaving substantial property and the
guardian of Rita petitioned in state court for a declaration naming
Rita as sole heir of Ezra. Relatives of the deceased intestate chal-
lenged on the basis that collateral relations of an intestate under
Louisiana law take to the exclusion of illegitimate children.
shows an intention . . . to remove the rigors of common law and to estab-
lish a rule of descent to illegitimates consonant with the finer sense of Jus-
tice and right, and not to visit the sins of the parents upon the unoffend-
Ing offspring.
See generally Note, Legitimation: The Liberal Judicial Trend in California, 19 HASTINGS
L. J. 232 (1967).
47. E.g., Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV.
337 (1963); KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 37-40 (1971).
48. Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
49. Levy v. La., 192 So.2d 193, 195 (La. App. 1967).
50. Levy v. La., 250 La. 25, 193 So.2d 530 (1969).
51. Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
52. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
53. The father fulfilled the requirements of Louisiana law. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
202-210 (1952).
NOTES
The Louisiana Code defines "acknowledged children" relating to
paternal inheritance rights as follows: "Illegitimate children who
have been acknowledged by their father, are called natural children
. . ,,," However, the code further states that such "children, though
duly acknowledged, cannot claim the rights of legitimate children,"55
unless, "their natural father, who has duly acknowledged them,
. . . has left no descendants, nor ascendants, nor collateral relations,
nor surviving wife . . . ."5 Following this statutory language, the
state court dismissed the guardian's petition.5 7
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court based upon the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Con-
stitution proved futile, and the Court affirmed the decision below.58
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, rejected petitioner's
claim that Levy was controlling, and stated "Levy did not say and
cannot fairly be read to say that a state can never treat an illegiti-
mate child differently from legitimate offspring. ' 5
The Court found no equal protection problem and did not discuss
the case in that light. Rather, it was conceded that, "[t]he power
. . . to regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a
man dying there is committed by the Constitution of the United
States ... to the legislature of that state. ' 60 The majority could find
no discrimination and distinguished the legitimate child from the il-
legitimate-the former being "socially sanctioned and legally rec-
ognized," and the latter as "illicit and beyond recognition of the
law.,
6
'
2. Is there an Equal Protection problem?
Labine refused to discuss the Louisiana statute in terms of equal
protection. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, noted:
For reasons not articulated, the Court refuses to consider in
this case whether there is any reason at all, or any basis
whatever, for the difference in treatment that Louisiana ac-
54. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art 202 (1952). It Is interesting to note that the civil code
recognizes three classifications of children for inheritance purposes: legitimate, natural
and bastard:
"[TJhose who have not been acknowledged by their father . . . are contra dis-
tinguished by the appellation of bastards." L. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 202 (1952). "Natural-
children [acknowledged illegitimates] . . . can not receive from their natural parents, by
donations inter vivos or Mortis Causa . . . whenever the father or the mother who has
thus disposed in their favor, leaves legitimate children or descendants." LA. Crv. CODE
ANN. art. 1482 (1952).
55. LA. Civ. CoDn ANN. art. 206 (1952).
56. LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (1952).
57. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed, Labine v. Vincent, 229 So.2d 449 (La.
App. 1969), and the Supreme Court of Louisiana denied certiori, Labine v. Vinoent, 255
La. 480, 231 So.2d 395 (1970).
58. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
59. Id. at 536.
60. Id. at 538.
61. Id,
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cords to publicly acknowledged illegitimates and to legiti-
mate children.6 2
However, the court seemingly asserted two grounds for its refusal
to discuss the problem in such a light. The first ground stated was
that the equal protection argument is inapplicable to the states, on
the basis that intestacy and the distribution of property is within
the exclusive area of state action."5
This served as the basis for Brennan's commentary that such
reasoning is contrary to "104 years of constitutional adjudication" in
that, "it is precisely state action which is subjected by the 14th
Amendment to its restraints.""e It is difficult to distinguish entrance
by the Court into the "traditional state area" of wrongful death re-
covery in Levy from judicial intrusion into intestacy on the basis
of equal protection. Before Levy, the former area was within the
"special" bounds of legislation reserved to the states and purely
statutory in origin. 63
The second ground for not discussing the equal protection argu-
ment was the assertion that such children are as different as con-
cubines and prostitutes are to a "chaste wife", a purely social dis-
tinction. Although there may be some justification for recognizing
distinctions between a concubine and a "chaste wife" to discourage
acts over which the former has control, why should legal dis-
abilities from this illicit sex attach to the child? It must be stressed
that the key to the child's argument is his lack of control over his
destiny, and in this respect the illegitimate is akin to the various
groups who have felt the racial and religious prejudices through the
ages.6
3. Which Equal Protection test is applicable?
The United States Supreme Court in the course of litigation con-
cerning equal protection has developed two distinct tests" -the ec-
62. Id. at 548.
63. Id. at 538.
64. Id. at 549.
65. E.g., W. PRossER, LAW OF ToRTs §§ 120-121 (3rd ed. 1964) ; S. SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR THE WrRONGFUL DEATH § 1:1-1:10 (1966).
"The law of successions, even more than wrongful death and tortious injury stat-
utes has been a Jealously protected province of state control, since the rules of succes-
sion are so intimately linked to the orderly descent and redistribution of property and
thereby constitute a cornerstone in the state tax structure . . . . Regardless of the
amount of discretion allowed, state statutes of any sort may not interfere with the indi-
vidual rights and freedoms which are guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution.
Therefore, even the laws of succession are susceptible of close scrutiny in light of such
standards as equal protection." Note, Discrimination Based Upon Illegitimacl as a De-
nial of Equal Protection, 43 TUL. L. REV. 383, 391 (1968).
66. Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 353
(1919) Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 1Anv. L. REV. 1067, 1173
(1969).
67. Note, aupra note 66, at 1077-1131.
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onomic interest test and the fundamental right 5l-suspect classifi-
cation test. 9 Cases dealing with businesses 70 and public utilities7'
have usually applied the former, namely, that the statute be rea-
sonably related to its purposes in regulating the rights of those
similarly situated.7 2 This test requires little active review of the pur-
poses of the statute or the statute itself as applied to the purposes.73
The second test developed in case law requires a more search-
ing inquiry by the courts into the statutory purpose. As such, the
burden of proof that the statute is reasonable in relation to its pur-
poses is shifted to the states,74 and "the state must select the
method of achieving its goal which least prejudices those within the
protective group. ' 75 Therefore, the statutes must be narrowly drawn
to meet the requirements of necessity and precision.7 6 As to suspect
classifications 7" it has been noted that:
Experience in America teaches that a racial classification
will usually be perceived as a stigma of inferiority and' a
badge of opprobrium. The same may be said of many nation-
al, ethnic, and religious classifications. In this sense, a racial
or national minority differs from an economic minority. In
this sense, too, race, lineage, and ethnic origin differ from
other congenital and unalterable characteristics such as sex
or certain physical capabilities. Indeed, the question of
whether opprobrium readily attaches to a particular classi-
ficiation may be the touch stone to predicting what other con-
68. Tussman v. tenBroeck, supra note 66, at 344-349, 367-373; Note, supra note 66,
at 1077-1087; Krause, Equal Protection For the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. Rv. 477, 485-
489 (1967).
69. See generally Tuseman & tenBroeck, supra note 66, at 353-361; Note, eupra note
66, at 1087-1131; Note, Uniform Probate Code-Illegitimacy. 69 MIcH. L. REv. 112, 113-
114 (1970).
70. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Central Lumber Co. v. S. Dak., 226 U.S. 157
(1912).
71. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1887); Missouri, Kansas, and Texas
Railway Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1903).
72. Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McKinley, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Note,
supra note 66, at 1078.
73. The economic test is a growth from a very old doctrine that any classification
must be reasonable. Hollen v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814) ; Vanyart v. Waddell, 8
Yerger 260, 270 (Tenn. 1829). This was the early restriction upon "[T]he essence of
classification . . . burdens different from those resting upon the general public ....
Indeed, the very idea of classification is inequality.... .. " Atchison, Topeka, and S.F.
R.R. v. Mathews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899). Naturally, great deference was paid to legis-
lative judgment in dealing with economics and business. "Reasonableness" became
quite broad since such regulation was usually technical and egalitarian principles seemed
to be left undisturbed when impersonal, inanimate, or inhuman organizations were sub-
ject to classification-oriented restrictions.
74. "A suspect classification must bear a higher degree of relevance to purpose than
other classifications . . . . For example, the ordinary presumption of validity is reversed
when a suspect classification is made." Note, supra note 66, at 1101; See also Fuji v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) ; Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
75. Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 118 U. PA. L. Rv.
1, 11 (1969).
76. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) ; Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
77. Kotch v. River Pilot Commr., 350 U.S. 552, 565 (1947) ; Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Fuji v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) ; Muir v. La. Park Theatrical Ass'n., 347 U.S.
971, (1954) ; vacating mem. 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Johnson v. Va., 373 U.S. 61
(1963).
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genital and unalterable traits will be viewed as suspect in
the future. Illegitimacy of birth, for example, would be a
likely candidate under this formulation. .... 71 (Emphasis add-
ed).
These minorities seem to possess the same hardship-lack of con-
trol over their status-such as race7 9 and ancestry. 0
The court has extended this searching inquiry to discrimination
involving fundamental rights."' Among rights which have apparent-
ly come within this definition are rights with respect to criminal
procedure,8 2  voting,83  procreation,8 4 education, 5  and travel8 -per-
personal interests. Apparently, the main reason for providing great-
er judicial protection here is that such rights are considered much
more important. 7
In Levy, the court seemed to base its decision in part upon the
intimate familial relationship between a child and his mother
prompting one commentator to note that this familial right must be
classified among the basic civil rights we all enjoy. 8 Others have
urged that the child has a right to the same relationship with his
father,89 a concept foreign to a society which seems to block this
relationship in most respects. It would certainly seem that there is
78. Note, Development in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1067, 1127
(1969). The Supreme Court applied this reasoning in Oyama v. Calif., 332 U.S. 631 (1948)
stating that a statute which barred Japanese citizens from holding certain land in the
United States, did not justify discrimination against his son merely because of the
status of his birth; therefore, the petitioner was allowed to keep the land and it did not
escheat to the state.
The Oyama case is similar to the circumstances in Labine since the petitioner's
main objection in that case was the burden of proof imposed upon him. For most chil-
dren, the court found that where a parent pays for a conveyance to his child there Is a
presumption that a gift was intended, and there is no presumption that the child takes
the land for the benefit of his parent. Thus, the burden of proving that there was no
do facto gift falls on those challenging the gift's validity. "Fred Oyama, on the other
hand, faced at the outset the necessity of overcoming a statutory presumption that con-
veyances financed by his father and recorded in Fred's name were not gifts at all ...
Fred was presumed to hold title for the benefit of his parent." Oyama v. Calif., 332 U.S.
631, 642 (1948). More important to the issue of equal protection, no other case In which
the penalty for a guardian's derelictions had fallen on anyone but the guardian was in
existence, the whole Idea of guardianship being to protect the ward during his incapacity.
"In Fred Oyama's case, however, the father's deeds were visited on the son; the ward
became the guarantor of his guardian's conduct. The cumulative effect, we believe, was
clearly to discriminate against Fred Oyama. He was saddled with an onerous burden of
proof which need not be borne by California children generally." Oyama v. Calif., 332
U.S. 631, 644 (1948).
79. Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954.) ; Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1969).
80. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'r., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
81. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ; Griffin v. Ill., 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ; Douglas v. Calif., 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969).
82. Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
83. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
84. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
85. Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
87. Note, supra note 66, at 1127-1129.
88. Comment, The Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 LOYOLA L. REv. 87, 109
(1969).
89. Note, Discrimination Based on Illegitimacy as a Denial of Equal Protection, 48
TuL. L. RFv. 383 (1969).
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sound argument for classifying the father-child relationship within
the sphere of fundamental rights, especially with today's moral and
social changes.90
4. The Levy Confusion: Analysis of Subsequent Cases
Did the court in Levy feel that classifications involving bastards
are suspect, thereby, throwing the burden of proof upon the state to
justify their statute? Note the following language:
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted upon the mother ....
[T]hey were hers in the biological and spiritual sense ....
(Emphasis added).
Another basis which the court could have relied upon is the
"fundamental rights" concept. Note this Levy court dicta: "[W]e
have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil
rights . . . the rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial
relationship between a child and his own mother." 92  (Emphasis
added). There is also dicta to support an interpretation that Levy
utilized the less stringent test. In any case, the Levy decision does
not discuss the alternative purposes or reasons upon which such
statutes are claimed to be based. It was due to this ambiguity that
the rights of illegitimates achieved varying treatment in the decis-
ions following Levy, although it seems that the subsequent cases did
imitate Levy uniformly in one respect-ambiguity, prompting one
authority to observe: "None of the cases that has been decided so
90. This is an aspect which the courts have avoided-the social stigma, not only in a
historical context, but also relative to our social familial structure. The discrimination
between the sexes has been a large cause of perpetuating this stigma wherein the com-
munity condemns the immoral woman (also condemning the child due to the physical
realities of who bears the child) and winks at the father. The community is unwilling
to attach such children too closely to him, although it sometimes extracts a minimum
support "price" for his acts, [b]ecause the mother cannot be expected to support [the
child] . . . in a world organized on feminine dependence." Davis, Illegitimacy and the
Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc. 217 n.5, 228 (1939):
It should be realized that Just as it takes two to make an act of prosti-
tution, so it takes two to procreate an illegitimate child. If one is to reason
in terms of the motivation of becoming an illegitimate parent, the father
as well as the mother should be considered. The pre-occupation with the fe-
male in the discussion of 'causes' . . .reflects the double standard of mor-
ality.
Since legal controls form only a framework of social life, one can say
that were It solely a matter of law, illegitimacy would constitute no great
hardship. But legal disabilities are sustained and supplemented by an atti-
tude that enters into the texture of daily life, coloring in countless ways
the feelings of the unfortunates . . . not only in its prsence a disgrace to
the . . . family, but its support may fall on them as well.
At present, although the father's relationship is being recognized by increasing penalties
to redress the "wrong" he has committed, society still seems to actively block the
father-child relationship and has not given the father rights in ascertaining the child's
future. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Deci-
ion on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CmI. L. Rlv. 338, 356-366 (1969).
91. Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
92. Id. at 71.
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far has attempted a careful analysis of the meaning and limits of
the Equal Protection Clause." 93 The courts following Levy not only
had to determine what constitutional test the United States Supreme
Court utilized, but also if the constitutional test used applied beyond
the factual context of Levy to the familial-paternal relationship,
and if so, to succession.
The Louisiana Supreme Court on remand reluctantly94 accepted
the Court's decision in December of 1968, extending the wrongful
death benefits under its statutes to the father:
The United States Supreme Court has held that, as alleged
in the petition of this case, when a parent openly and pub-
licly recognizes and accepts an illegitimate to be his or her
child and the child is dependent upon the parent, such an
illegitimate is a 'child' as expressed in Civil Code Article
2315.15 (Emphasis added).
In this respect the Louisiana court inadvertently extended the rights
of the illegitimate beyond the mere facts of the case, to encompass
the father-child relationship. Just prior to the Levy decision, the Su-
preme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, extended the right of
recovery to the illegitimate child for her father's death under that
state's wrongful death statute, but in a spirit of benevolence, rather
than inadvertance, noting:
[I]t is apparent that construction of a statute to thrust the
burden of illegitimacy upon an innocent child would be an
unfortunate and ill advised exercise of our judicial function,
and one we choose to avoid.96
The Family Court of New York City applied Levy to New York's
paternal support statute in Storm v. None, 7 to invalidate an agree-
ment for support of a child born out of wedlock by its father as
"unfair" to the child in light of the father's $45,000 per year income.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, also sitting en banc, followed Storm
stating: "Levy. . .point[s] the way to the inescapable conclusion
that the support obligation owed by a father to his legitimate child
cannot differ substantially from the duty owed to his illegitimate
93. Krause, aupra note 45, at 102.
94. "The members of this court may totally disagree with the reasoning and the re-
sults of the United States Supreme Court majority opinion and may agree with the dis-
sent of Justice Harlan wherein it was said that the majority resolved the issue In this
case ' . . . by a process that can only be described as brute force.' Nevertheless it is our
obligation to discharge our responsibility under constitutional authority and limitation."
Levy v. La., 253 La. 73, 216 So.2d 818, 820 (1969).
95. Levy v. La., 253 La. 73, 216 So.2d 818, 819-820 (1969).
96. Armijo v. Wesselius, 440 P.2d 471, 473 (Wash. 1968) ; accord, R.._._ v. R
431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
97. Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fan. Ct N.Y. City 1968); see
also Schmall v. Creecy, 254 A.2d 525 (N.J. 1969) ; In re Estate of Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756,
803 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1969).
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child." 9 8 The Surrogate's Court of Kings County, New York relied
on Levy to allow an illegitimate child access to "letters of adminis-
tration" which were necessary for her recovery under New York's
Wrongful Death statute for her father's death.19 New York requires
formal judicial proceedings to be initiated within two years from the
birth of the child as the only means of legitimation. Pursuant to this,
the court noted that:
[N]o initiative of a child, since at age two he cannot act
for himself, can achieve for him legitimate status. This court
and other courts have questioned the constitutionality of such
procedures.... The essence of the opinion in Levy is that it
is invidious to discriminate against them (illegitimate chil-
dren) when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is pos-
sibly relevant to the harm that was done to the mother.100
The Surrogate's court distinguished Labine on the facts as applic-
able only to inheritance,'0 ' but the implication that Labine will be
used as an argument in the future to restrict other rights is apparent.
On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, without dis-
cussing Levy, refused to extend its welfare statutes to an illegitimate
as far as the father was concerned. 0 2 Applying similar reasoning,
the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected the claim that Levy applied to
any father-child relationship, narrowly holding Levy to its facts and
refused to extend the protection of its support statute equally to il-
legitimates:
[Levy v. Louisiana] had not been decided at the time ap-
pellee presented his case in this court, but we believe that
it is inapplicable. The rights announced in Levy were based
on the intimate, familial relationship which exists between
a mother and her child, whether the child is legitimate or
illegitimate. 0 3 (Emphasis added)
Presented with the question of whether Levy applies to succession,
the Louisiana court gained some recompence for their former in-
advertance when in Succession of Bush'0 it expressly refused to
apply Levy to invalidate their restrictive intestacy statutes, even
where the father had attempted to adopt the illegitimate child into
his family:
While we do not consider the Levy case to be analogous
98. Munn v. Munn, 450 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1969).
99. In re Estate of Ross, 323 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Surrogate's Court, Kings County 1971).
100. Id. at 772.
101. Id.
102. State v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970).
103. Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 239 N.*E.2d 62 (1968).
104. Succession of Bush, 222 So.2d 642 (La App. 1969); accord, Labine v. Vincent,
249 So.2d 449 (La. App. 1969).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to the case before us we feel constrained to add that we are
not disposed to extend by analogy the holding in that case to
any case which does not involve the same codal article and
the same factual situation. 10 5
In re Estate of Jensen,10 6 decided by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, is the only case to date that has applied Levy to strike down
a succession statute. An examination of North Dakota's history ex-
poses two extreme positions. Prior to 1917, North Dakota adhered to
the common law rule,'10 7 but in that year the legislature granted full
inheritance rights to all illegitimate children. 0 However, in 1943, the
1917 Act was repealed 01 which resulted in "a re-embracement" of
the common law, which treated an illegitimate child as a child of
no one and deprived him of being an heir of anyone.
In 1969, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in In re Estate of
Jensen10 took a dim view of this turn of events, noting that the
repeal of 1943, ". . .was a return to the unjust rule which visited
the sins of the parents upon the unoffending offspring.""' Although
the second clause of the statute which dealt with the rights of legit-
imates to inherit through their illegitimate father from the latter's
parents was applicable to the facts, the Jensen court discussed the
whole statute and conspicuously did not separate the first clause,
which denied illegitimates the right of inheritance from their father.
Thus, the entire statute was declared unconstitutional by the court
which stated:
This statute, which punishes innocent children for their
parents transgressions, has no place in our system of gov-
ernment, which has as one of its basic tenets equal protec-
tion for all.1
2
The application of Levy in Jensen was relied upon by a Florida
county court to strike a statute which required paternal acknowl-
edgment as a prerequisite to any intestate inheritance rights. This
court in In re Caldwell's Estate,113 incorporated this Jensen dicta as
a basis for its holding:
105. Id. at 644.
106. In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1969).
107. N.D. CoMP. LAWS § 5752 (1913).
108. N.D. COMP. LAWS § 5745 (1917).
109. N.D. REV. CODE § 56-01-05 (1943).
110. In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1969).
111. Id. at 869.
112. Id. at 878. This decision led the North Dakota electives in 1969 to repeal the 1943
Statute thereby eliminating the discrimination that the North Dakota Supreme Court
saw fit to condemn. N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1971). A note pursuant to the
above quoted North Dakota Statute illustrates the motivation of the legislators. "This
section [the 1943 measure] prior to the 1969 amendment was held unconstitutional as an
Invidious discrimination against illegitimate children in violation of § 1 of the 14th
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution .... " N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1971).
113. In re Caldwell's Estate, 33 Fla. Supp. 158 (1970).
NoTEs
Applying the reasoning in Levy, as no action, conduct,
or demeanor of the illegitimate children in the instant case
is relevant to their status of illegitimacy, we conclude that
the classification for purposes of inheritance contained in
[the statute] which is based on such a status and which re-
sults in illegitimate children being disinherited while their
legitimate brothers and sisters inherit, is unreasonable.114
It appears that the Jensen and Caldwell cases viewed such clas-
sifications as suspect, and therefore placed a heavier burden upon
the states to justify such statutes.
Although the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida affirm-
ed in a memorandum decision, 115 the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed. 116 The court felt it could not abrogate common law where not
altered by statute, even ". . though we prefer a liberal interpre-
tation of the Florida legitimacy statutes . . . -"1"7 No discussion of
equal protection was attempted, the court stating:
We do not find in this case that there has been a demon-
stration of unconstitutionality sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption that the statute is valid. Under the common law,
no inherent right of inheritance existed regardless of whether
the survivor was legitimate or illegitimate.""8
The dissent pointed out that many courts have struck the common
law doctrine if it was unjust, or if changing times warranted such a
change, agreeing with the county court that Levy and Jensen should
apply as a basis for declaring the discriminatory statute unconstit-
utional." 9 The court left the burden upon the claimants to overcome
the statutory presumption of validity. Great deference was given to
the legislature and no discussion of the possible archaic and prejud-
icial motives incorporated into this Florida statute was undertaken.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Estate Pakarinen20 did
discuss its illegitimate-intestacy statute in the light of equal protec-
tion. However, the court upheld its validity as it required acknowl-
edgment by the father as a prerequisite to inheritance. The Min-
nesota Court interpreted Levy to hold unconstitutional distinctions
based solely on the basis of illegitimacy; nevertheless, it felt that:
[N]either Levy, . . . [nor Storm] . . . can be considered
controlling authority for the proposition that it is constitu-
114. Id. at 167.
115. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 240 So.2d 538 (Fla. App. 1970) (memorandum decision).
116. In re Estate of Caldwell, - Fla. _ 247 So.2d 1 (1971).
117. Id, at 3.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 9-12 (Ervin dissenting).
120. In re Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970'), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 903(1971); accord, Kostamo v. Northern City National Bank, 287 Minn. 556, 178 N.W.2d
896 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
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tionally impermissible to require an illegitimate attempting
to inherit from his putative father to produce virtually un-
assailable proof that the decedent is in fact his father for
the distinct purpose of determining his rights of inheritance.
(Emphasis added) .121
It is clear that the court applied a rational relationship-economic
test to uphold its statute, but it seems strange that the court did
not require the state to meet a stricter test of justification for its
statute since if did seem to find classifications based "solely on il-
legitimacy" as prohibited. 122 The court did find such a relationship
between the testator's intent and the acknowledgment provisions. As
further "justification for the different treatment afforded this clas-
sification of illegitimates,' ' 12 3 the court felt that the difficulty in as-
certaining paternity precluded conclusive certainty, and thus war-
ranted this severe burden of proof.
Perhaps the best interpretation of Levy is that the decision rests
on the grounds of both "suspect criteria" and "fundamental rights."
It may be that neither illegitimacy, nor the familial right of inher-
itance, or for that matter any concept of familial relationship, would
prompt a strict test when standing alone. Yet when considered to-
gether, these factors could very well trigger such a test. This test
would be analogous to the balancing test implemented by those
courts that considered the interest of criminal classifications based
upon ability to pay,12 4 the interest of education combined with the
race criteria, 125 or the indigency-travel duet of Shapiro v. Thomp-
121. In re Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714, 717 (1970).
122. Id. at 717. The Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to grant the child a share of
her intestate father's estate since the child had not met the statutory burden of proof.
In doing so the court rejected the petitioner's claim that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated on the reasoning that unlike her biological siblings her rights were contingent
upon her father's acts over which she had no control. The Minnesota Court, in contrast
to the Labine Court did see the problem in an equal protection context. The Minnesota
Court apparently utilized the less stringent test in finding the Minnesota statutes re-
quiring acknowledgment to be in furtherance of the desires of the testator. "[I]t cannot
be said that distinctions made in § 572.172 are 'irrational' or bear no 'relation to the
purpose' sought to be achieved." Id. Although the Minnesota Court discussed the father's
intent in the context of refuting an equal protection argument, it is obvious that a pos-
sible due process claim can also be raised. This test is an attempt to compare the ra-
tionality of a statute to its purpose, the question being whether the legislators or offi-
cials in question had set up arbitrary, or unreasonable guidelines which have no relation
to the purpose sought. The standard upon which the courts have measured such a rela-
tionship in the past are the concepts of 'fundamental fairness' or the 'American scheme
of justice'." Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1937).
However, it may well be repugnant to a natural concept of fairness that an arbitrary
standard of proof is imposed to exclude one class from inheriting. The Minnesota Court
reached its conclusion despite realizing, "[T]hat the innocent child cannot with any Justi-
fication be held accountable for the transgressions of his parents." In re Pakarinen, 287
Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1970). In addition, the petitioner submitlted several
pieces of evidence to support his claim-a birth certificate naming the intestate as her
father, a paternity proceeding finding the decedent as the father, as well as a letter and
oral testimony.
123. In re Pakarlnen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1970).
124. Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Calif., 872 U.S. 353 (1963).
125. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967).
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son.126 Certainly, the nature of the interest sought by such children
is more akin to a fundamental right than an economic matter, and
the status of an illegitimate over which he has no control should
receive a more than passing glance.127
PURPOSE ADVANCED BY THE STATES
IN SUPPORT OF DISCRIMINATORY STATUTES
One of the primary deficiencies of the preceding cases is the
failure to discuss the relation of the various purposes advanced to
justify such statutes. It is important to note that the Louisiana
statute is the most restrictive in the United States, not only placing
a severe limitation on the right to inherit from the putative father,
but also restricting the illegitimate child's right to mdternal inheri-
tance as well.128 The Labine decision may therefore hold severe con-
sequences for the child born out of wedlock. Nonetheless, the re-
strictiveness of a statute being a question of degree, the preceding
discussion of equal protection and the following examination of the
purposes advanced for such statutes can be applied to all "restric-
tive measures." However, the Louisiana standards would certainly
be the most difficult to justify.
The rationale for such distinctions that have been advanced can
be summarized as follows: that such statutes (1) are an attempt to
distribute property pursuant to the father's intent, (2) discourage
promiscuity, (3) promote marriage and family unity and harmony,
(4) avoid severe problems of proof which would beset the courts, (5)
preserve the quiet title of property.
1. The father's intent:
The supposed purpose of intestacy law is to distribute property
according to the testator's will.129 Thus the argument is made that
most fathers do not want their out-of-wedlock mistakes to inherit.
Several objections to this reasoning have been advanced.
First, it seems that the premise that discriminatory statutes
should not include those it does not intend to cover, and should in-
clude those it intended to cover, is not met.2 0 It is evident that the
statues exclude illegitimates who live with the putative father, ei-
cluding them from the normal means of proof, and thus the statute
is under-inclusive. On the other hand, children of separated or di-
vorced parents who may never see their father, and whom the lat-
126. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); See generally Note, supra note 66, at
1130.
127. Table I, Appendix.
128. LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 918 (1952).
129. 23 AM. JR. 2d Descent and Distrtbution § 10 (1966); In re Pakarinen, 287 Minn.
330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970).
130. Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. RPv. 341,
344-353 (194.9).
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ter never intended to inherit, would be presumed to be within the
statutory language. As such the statute is over-inclusive. However,
the under-inclusive, over-inclusive doctrine is a shakey foundation
upon which to launch an attack against such statutes since
under and over-inclusiveness has been upheld in giving legislative
reasoning the benefit of the doubt.13 1 Yet, when a suspect criterion
or fundamental right is involved, under-or-over-inclusiveness is
much less desirable due to the importance of the rights sacrificed,
as well as the possibilities of prejudice. 13 2
Another angle of attack, assuming that it is reasonable to pre-
sume that intestates intended to exclude their illegitimate children
from taking through intestacy provisions, is the argument that court
enforcement of the discriminatory intent of such decedents consti-
tutes invalid "state action" under Shelley v. Kraemer:'
[Shelly and similar cases reveal instances] in which the
states have made available to such individuals the full co-
ersive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the
grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights
in premises which petitioners are willingly and financially
able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.
The difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforce-
ment of the restrictive covenants is the difference to peti-
tioners [illegitimates] between being denied rights of prop-
erty of other members of the community and being accorded
full enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.'3
As such, the Shelley court would not allow the law to deprive Negroes
housing by upholding prejudices of apartment owners. Professor
Harry Krause analogizes the Shelley facts to the prejudices of the
father against his illicit offspring in this manner:
It may also be true that the majority of fathers would not
wish their bastard child to take under the laws of intestacy
as if they were legitimate, so that the legislated presumption
in favor of the legitimate child finds support in the actual
intent of the majority of intestates. However, the question re-
mains whether state law may express a prejudice, real
though it may be, which rests on a pattern of discrimination
that had been practiced with the encouragement of the church
and the state until it became part of the 'normal' intent of
the majority. 35 (Emphasis added).
131. Railway Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106 (1949) ; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1940); Note, supra note 66, at 1084, 1085.
132. I-irabayashl v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). See generally Note, aupra
note 66, at 1086, 1087.
133. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
134. Id. at 19.
135. Krause, Equal Protection For The Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 477, 501-602
(1967).
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It would seem further that this basis would not sit well with any
concept of responsibility of the father for his "mistake," nor with
the interests of the state in reducing the large number of illegitimates
on the welfare rolls. 18
2. Discouraging Promiscuity
Some states have advanced the proposition that the discrimina-
tion against the child will reflect upon the conscience of the parents,
thereby causing them to curtail their illicit conduct. Discrimination
against a child on this basis can hardly stand beneath the pillars
of equal protection and due process. To punish one in order to es-
tablish guilt feelings in another is repugnant to any concept of fair-
ness. Secondly, the statute is totally unrelated to its purpose as evi-
denced by the great increases in the number of illegitimate children
born each year in the past decade-from 240,200 in 1961 to 339,200
in 1968. The illegitimacy rate per 1000 births has almost doubled in
that span.13 7 The concept of any relation of inheritance statutes to
discouraging promiscuity is doubtful according to most writers in
light of this evidence.13
3. Promotion of Marriage and Family Unity
The comments applicable to the "promiscuous discussion" above
retain equal validity when applied to this purpose. 39 The growing
rate of illegitimacy and unwed, divorced, or deserted mothers seems
to refute the "promotion of marriage" concept.140 Nevertheless, the
idea of familial unity is particularly important to Louisiana as point-
ed out by the majority in Labine: "Even if we were to apply the
'rational basis' test to the Louisiana intestate succession statute,
that statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's in-
terest in promoting family life .... 1,141 Punishment of those who have
no control over their status for this purpose can be questioned in
light of fundamental fairness, but a more forceful argument seems
to lie in the reality that Louisiana has not escaped the general de-
emphasis of the family as the basis of all relationships. For at
least two decades, the population growth has lagged far behind the
illegitimacy rate in Louisiana, and the increasing divorce rate is not
foreign to that state.1 42 Basing the discrimination of children upon
the latter two bases does not fit into today's realities, rather, it is
based upon ancient English and Roman Familial concepts.
136. Table III, Appendix.
137. Table II, Appendix.
138. Supra note 135, at 491-492; Tucker, supra note 9, at 642; Comment, The Status
of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 LOYOLA L. Rzv. 87, 90-91 (1969).
139. Krause, supra note 1, at 348-349.
140. Table III, Appendix.
141. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 (1971).
142. Table IV, Appendix.
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4. Burden of Proof
Perhaps the most compelling argument on its face is the prop-
osition that it is impossible to ascertain the true father of an il-
legitimate by any means of proof, and therefore, the illegitimate
child should not be allowed to introduce evidence to establish pater-
nity for inheritance purposes. Rather, the only means of assuring
proof is to require acknowledgment by the parent for such purposes.13
This approach is tantamount to requiring a will specifically naming
such children as heirs, as a condition to inheritance. Such a concept
is contrary to the provisions of intestacy as to legitimates in every
state where the offspring is entitled to inherit absent specific lan-
guage in a will excluding the child. Objections to this reasoning on
the basis of furthering the father's intent have been disclosed above,
and the concepts of fundamental fairness, the responsibility of the
father for his deeds, and the idea that the offspring should receive
his natural bounty are equally forceful in questioning this purpose.
Another proposition is advanced that to allow such children to
sue in a judicial proceeding to establish paternity will open a pan-
dora's box of proof problems and fraudulent claims. This reflects a
distrust of our judicial system as to its ability to handle problems
of proof. This argument would seem to negate paternity proceedings
to establish a right of support from the alleged father, a universal
practice. In addition, several states have found that utilizing the
conventional court procedure to establish paternity for inheritance
purposes has not prompted a plague of spurious claims.1"
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in In re Pak-
arinen's Estate that:
[W]here a reputed father denies paternity, no method of
proof we are now aware of exists by which fatherhood can
be established. Nothing-not a blood test, not a judgment
of paternity after trial, nor a voluntary plea of guilty to a
charge of paternity in open court-proves with absolute
certainty the paternity of the father. And while a written
attested declaration of paternity does not provide absolute
proof, it does offer the most persuasive proof available (short
of marriage to the mother) of the pivotal element: and un-
equivocal acknowledgment of paternal affection and concern
for the illegitimate child. (Emphasis added).145
Yet what the child is claiming is a right to the familial relationship
143. In re Pakarinen's Estate, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714, 718 (1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 903 (1971).
144. fIowa has long allowed commonplace evidence admissible to establish paternity
under its code provisions. Britt v. Hall, 116 Ia. 564, 90 N.W. 340 (1902) (Letters) ;
In re Wise's Estate, 206 Ia. 939, 221, N.W. 567 (1928) (Neighborhood reports); Robert-
son v. Campbell, 168 Ia. 47, 149 N.W. 885 (1914). (Generally reputed to be the father).
145. In re Pakarinen's Estate, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.24 714, 718 (1970).
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with his father, thus it seems of little importance whether the father
feels affection or concern for his "mistake." A strong argument can
be made that such a line is arbitrary and unreasonable in light of
the interest denied the child and therefore is violative of due process.
Since it is difficult to draw the line, a solution would seem to lie in
allowing a child his day in court giving him a chance to establish
his biological relationship.
Secondly, in light of recent refinements in tissue typing and
antigen blood grouping tests, the possibility of holding a non-father
liable in a paternity suit may have disappeared as a realistic con-
cern. The rate of error has dropped to .00095 per cent in determining
the contributor of the sperm. 146 Today such tests are viewed as re-
liable, simple, reproducable, and dependable:
The suggested test should eliminate past difficulties in
establishing paternity. In a civil action, the proof needed to
sustain that action is that quantity of evidence which produces
a reasonable assurance of the existence of the ultimate fact.
It is not necessary to produce that quantum of proof called
for in a criminal action, in which one must establish a po-
sition beyond a reasonable doubt and preclude any hypothe-
sis except the one asserted. The proposed antigen test, along
with other evidence, should be more than sufficient to es-
tablish reasonable assurance of paternity and arguably
could meet the criminal standard.14 7
The burden of proof is naturally greater for an illegitimate just by
the nature of the birth, but it seems illogical to place unduly bur-
densome and unreasonable proofs of paternity upon the whim of any
particular state.
Closely related to the proof argument is the state's interest in
quiet land titles. It is evident that if paternity is to be established
during the father's lifetime this argument vanishes, since fraudulent
suits which would tie up property probate proceedings would be ex-
cluded. Furthermore, such fears in this area have not been realized
in those states that do allow paternity actions.
CONCLUSION
The call for judicial action and state action to change discrimi-
natory practices is prolific, encompassing this general theme:
It seems only fair that the natural offspring of decedents
should be the object of their bounty in the state's estate
146. Note, Illegitimacy: Equal Protection and How to Enjoy It, 4 GA. L. J. 383, 403
(1969).
147. Id. See generally Comment, Blood Grouping Tests and The Presumption of Legiti-
macy, 4 U. RICH. L. RPv. 297 (1970).
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plan. Illegitimate offspring are no less deserving of their
natural parents' bounty because of a mere accident of birth
then are their legitimate brethren ... at least from the stand-
point of social justice. 4 1
Foreign systems seem well on their way to recognizing the il-
legitimates. Norway and the Latin American countries have embodi-
ed the position of total equality first brought forth during the French
Revolution.149 Panama proclaims in its constitution, in language sim-
ilar to that found in most Latin American constitutions that, "par-
ents have the same duties toward children born out of wedlock as
those born in it." All children are equal before the law and have the
same hereditary rights in intestate succession,' 50 and in Guatemala
the ". . . law shall establish the means of proof in investigating pa-
ternity . .. " 51 for this purpose. More recent changes have swept
through Europe, including Germany,1 2 granting substantial equality
to illegitimates, although France embodies the concepts inherent in
Louisiana's Code. Even in the latter case, however, France is more
cognizant of the illegitimate's rights. 153 And in England, the conclu-
sion of a committee commissioned to study illegitimacy revealed its
position on the matter: "[where] paternity is established. . . the
extra-marital child should have the same rights to succeed to his
father's estate as the father's legitimate children, whether the father
is survived by legitimate children or not.'
The current libertarian trend of thought has brought forth stat-
utory proposals to establish substantial equality. 55 Basically these
statutes embody the following at the very least:
148. Note, Uniform Probate Code---Illegitimacy, 69 MICH. L. REV. 112, 119 (1970).
149. Robbins & Deak, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Con-
paative Study, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 308, 325 (1936); Stone, Illegitimacy and Claims to
Money and Other Property: A Comparative Survey, 15 INT'L & COmp. L. REv. 505, 520-
527 (1967). This general trend follows the position taken by the United Nations.
"[EJvery person once his filiation is established, shall have the same legal status as a
person born in wedlock." U.N. Doc. of (January 13, 1967) as quoted in Krause, Bastards
Abroad-Poreign Approaches to Illegitimacy, 15 AM. J. CoMp. L. 726 (1967).
150. PANAMA CONST. art. 58 as quoted in Krause, Bastards Abroad-Foreign Ap-
proaches to Illegitimacy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 726, 728 (1967).
151. GUATAMALA CONST. art. 86(2), (3) as quoted in Krause, supra note 150, at 728.
152. A thorough discussion of Germany's new law, as a proposal and after it became
law can be found in Krause, supra note 150, at 730-746, and in Bohndorf, The New
Illegitimacy Law in Germany, 19 INT'L. & ComP. L. Q. 299 (1970).
153. Stone, supra note 149, at 521-522.
154. Report of the Committee on the Law of Succession in Relation to Illegitimate
Persons, 30 MOD. L. Rnv. 552, 555 (1967).
155. Note, Uniform Probate Code-Illegitimacy, 69 MicH. L. REv. 112 (1970) ; Bohn-
dorf, The New Illegitimacy Law in Germany, 19 INT'L. & COmp. L. Q. 299 (1970);
Krause, Bringing the Bastard Into the Great Soiety-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legiti-
macy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829 (1966).
'It is questionable whether it is fundamentally fair within the confines of due process
to require this form of statute as a means of implementing the father's desires. Would
not a requirement that if a father wishes to disinherit his illegitimate offspring that he
expressly state his intention in a will be the only fair means of disinheriting such chil-
dren?
Due process is no longer championed by judicial thinkers due to the disfavor the
test engendered when it was the basis upon which judges ran rampant through the legis-
lative field of business economics. Note, supra note 66, at 1130-1132; Tussman &
NOTES
1. A means to establish paternity in court, emphasizing the
child's interest.
2. Language equalizing an illegitimate to a legitimate child.
3. A strengthening of a father-child relationship.
4. A statute of limitations (to ,protect state land titles).
5. An assurance that this equality extends to successions.
Whatever the procedural guidelines of such a statute, it should es-
tablish at its base the concept of equality-the remainder is merely
framework. As such, the North Dakota statute serves this purpose
commendably.
Finally, it must be stressed that the United States Supreme
Court in Labine v. Vincent embodies the extreme position-that
illegitimates are not equal under the Consitution. The state, therefore,
needs no justification to destroy or limit their rights-not proof,
nor paternal intent, nor familial relationship. Somehow the court
adopted, rather than the French Revolutionary ideals of 1783, Jus-
tinian's Civil Code as the guideline to follow. It should be noted that
the historical social stigma, and the pressures induced psychologi-
cally, are of great weight upon the illegitimate. The laws of our
nation should not be another addition to this load nor a reinforce-
ment thereof. The libertarian concepts of other nations, consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
should be adopted. It seems that this final recommendation should
follow-the terms "bastard" and "illegitimate" should be dropped
in referring to the child in favor of "extra-marital" or "out-of-wed-
lock" for it is the parent, not the child, who is illicit.
JAY R. PETTERSON
tenBroeck, supra note 66, at 362. It was condemned for substitution of the judiciary for
the legislature in the early 20th Century in cases such as Lockner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45
(1905). This demise caused judges to utilize other tests such as equal protection (Tuss-
man & tenBroeck, supra note 108, at 362) or various penumbras of the first eight amend-
ments [Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965)] even when due process was argued by
counsel. In fact, the implementation of a wider ranging review when fundamental inter-
ests were at stake arose not in due process but in equal protection. When the tests re-
quire the states to make a strong showing to uphold the apparent injustices created by a
classification, "[It may be the trappings of equal protection." Note, supra note 66, at
1132. The old cliche of "half dozen of one, six of the other" may be applicable here, but
for the fact that:
[lIt does not appear . . . that every interest deemed fundamental under the
equal protction clause will be protected by the due process clause. It may be,
for example, that the due 'process clause does not require that a state pro-
vide a criminal defendant with an appeal as of right, whereas the equal pro-
tection clause does require that if the state provides an appeal to some it
cannot deny it to others because of their inability to pay even where such
a denial can be rationally defended. Note, supra note 66, at 180.
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TABLE III
LOUISIANA ILLEGITIMACY RATIO-Per Color
Total Non-White White
1940 4,168 3,700 468
1950 5,991 5,444 547
1960 8,248 7,254 994
1961 8,405 7,436 969
1962 8,661 7,567 1,094
1963 8,666 7,516 1,150
1964 9,567 8,441 1,126
1965 9,493 8,336 1,157
1966 9,700 8,391 1,309
1967 9,906 8,508 1,398
An analysis of the data will reveal the following:
From 1940-50, population rose 13.5% while illegitimate births increased 43.8%.
From 1950-60 population rose 21.4% while illegitimate births increased 37.7%.
From 1940-60, population rose 39.0%, while illegitimate births increased 97.9%.
Thus, for at least the last two decades in Louisiana, illegitimate births have been
growing at a faster rate than population.
From 1960-67, illegitimate births have grown at a rate of 20.19.
Comment, The Status of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 16 Loyola L. Rev. 114
Louisiana has held itself out for special analysis since its -statutes have pro-
duced such a wealth of familial legislation. Note the extreme imbalance of black
versus white illegitimate births, while there are more whites in Louisiana than
blacks.
TABLE IV
ALL AFDC FAMILIES: STATUS OF FATHER, BY NUMBER OF
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-1969
Total fam ilies ..- ...------------------------- ...............-  - - - .. -............................. . . . ............ 1,591,000
Status of Father Total
D ead ......................................................................................................................................... 86,500
Incap acitated .......................................................................................................................... 177,300
Unemployed, or employed part time, and:
Enrolled in a work or training program .......................................................... 34,000
Awaiting enrollment after referral to WIN .................................................. 14,800
Neither enrolled nor awaiting enrollment ........................................................ 26,700
Absent from the home:
Divorced ...........................................
Legally separated ..........................
Separated without court decree
Deserted ... .......................................
Not married to mother .................
222,200
44,800
175,200
247,700
453,500
.............................................................................
.................... . ..................  ..... ...........
...........................................................................
........................................................................
NoTEs 91
In prison ......................................................................................................................... 41,400
Other reason .................................................................................................................. 26,000
Other status:
Stepfather case ............................................................................................................ 29,100
Children deprived of support or care of mother ............................................ 11,600
U n k n o w n ................................................................................................ --  2 0 0
Looseleaf, Public Services Division, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare
(Wash., D.C. 1969).

